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1 Introduction
The allocation of funds between economic agents in financial surplus and economic
agents in financial deficit can be considered as the major function of the financial
system of an economy (cf. Hellwig, 2000a, p. 3). In this regard the former – usually
called lenders – wish to profitably invest their funds and the latter – usually called
borrowers – require to obtain outside finance in order to operate profitable projects.
However, there are several factors which complicate the efficiency of performing this
function. Especially the level of available information regarding the contracting
situation and the economic agents’ attitudes towards risk are possibly the most
important ones.
Traditionally, research focused on the interdependence between efficiency of the
financial system and information availability. Especially the seminal work of Gale
and Hellwig (1985) analyzed the influence of information asymmetries on optimal
contracts between borrowers and lenders of funds. Gale and Hellwig (1985) use a
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costly state verification model similar to the one of Townsend (1979) to show that
optimal incentive compatible contracts between risk neutral borrowers and lenders
are standard debt contracts (SDC’s). But, in fact, assuming risk neutrality of both
contracting parties seems to be quite restrictive. Therefore, Gale and Hellwig (1985)
consider also the case of risk aversion of the borrower. They point out that this is
the more tractable case since with risk aversion of the lender one has to consider the
other contractual arrangements of the lender when analyzing the optimal contract
between borrower and lender (cf. Gale and Hellwig, 1985, p. 660f.). The meaning
of this observation becomes clear when one considers the literature on choice under
uncertainty with multiple sources of risk. In particular Kimball (1993) indicates
that the behavior of risk averse decision makers changes when they are exposed to
a further source of risk even when risks are statistically independent. Hence, since
the several contractual arrangements of the lender can be expected to expose her to
multiple sources of risk, the conjecture of Gale and Hellwig (1985) refers to changes
in the lender’s behavior in the manner described.
But why should there be risk aversion of lenders? Of course, when one considers
lenders to be private households there are several reasons why they may behave
risk averse. For example, private households usually do not have enough funds to
achieve sufficient diversification of their risks arising from undertaking investment
projects. Thus their personal wealth largely depends on just a few – or even a single
– investment projects. As a result, one can expect private households to care about
the investment project’s level of risk. Therefore, Gale and Hellwig (1985) argue that
lenders are meant to be banks or other financial institutions which behave as if they
are risk neutral due to sufficiently diversified investment portfolios. In fact, this as-
sumption seems obvious since there is empirical evidence that financial institutions
are major actors in the savings-investment process (see Gorton and Winton, 2002, p.
5ff., for a survey of the empirical literature). However, recent theoretical work ana-
lyzed several reasons why the assumption of risk neutrality may not hold. Especially
Froot et al. (1993) present a formal argument for a per se risk neutral firm to be-
have as if it were risk averse. The reason is that – starting out from the observation
that externally obtained funds are more expensive than funds generated internally –
undertaking investment projects requires to obtain external finance when internally
generated funds do not suffice. Hence the firm has an incentive to reduce random
variations of internally generated funds in order to minimize the need for expensive
external finance. Froot and Stein (1998) show this reasoning to hold for the bank-
ing industry likewise. Furthermore they show that the endogenous risk aversion
is decreasing in the amount of capital the bank holds. Another important reason
for risk averse behavior of financial institutions is derived by Pausch and Welzel
(2002) and Ku¨rsten (2001). They show that capital adequacy regulation explains
risk averse behavior of banks. The reason is as follows: capital adequacy regulation
forces banks to hold the higher amounts of capital the higher the banks’ exposure
to risk. Since capital is costly, the regulation imposes costs on banks when they face
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higher levels of risk and, thus, makes banks care about the level of risk in this way.
With these arguments risk aversion of lenders may be an obvious assumption.
Therefore, in this paper I analyze optimal incentive compatible debt contracts
when lenders behave risk averse. The objective in this regard is twofold. First, it is
necessary to determine the structure of the optimal contract with risk averse lenders
when there is just a single source of risk. This enables a comparison of the optimal
contract when lenders behave risk averse with the one in the standard model with
risk neutral lenders of Gale and Hellwig (1985). I then introduce a further source of
risk the lender is exposed to. The additional risk can be considered as the aggregate
risk of all other contracts of the lender. In this way I provide a formal analysis of
the conjecture of Gale and Hellwig (1985) that with risk averse lenders there is an
interdependency between the optimal incentive compatible debt contract and all the
other contracts of the lender. Second, I will point out that the results of the analysis
presented in this paper, which are derived in a setting with asymmetric information,
are closely related to the findings of the industrial organization approach of banking
of e.g. Freixas and Rochet (1997), Wahl and Broll (2000) and Broll and Welzel
(2002).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I present a
simple base model and determine the optimal incentive compatible debt contract
when lenders are risk averse and exposed to a single source of risk. However, the
formal analysis differs from the one of Gale and Hellwig (1985) since their more
intuitive derivation of optimal contracts is no longer applicable with risk averse
lenders. As the main result I derive the optimal incentive compatible contract to be
still a SDC. However, risk aversion of the lender increases the payment obligation of
the optimal SDC compared to the situation with risk neutral lenders. In section 3 I
introduce a further source of risk which can be thought of as the aggregate (random)
repayment from the lender’s other investment projects. The following analysis shows
that, in fact, there exists an interdependency between the several contracts just like
supposed by Gale and Hellwig (1985). I will argue that the further risk increases the
lender’s level of absolute risk aversion and, therefore, forces the borrower to further
increase the payment obligation of the SDC. Section 4 concludes.
2 Optimal Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts
with Risk Averse Lenders
For the formal analysis I apply a model very similar to the ones of Gale and Hellwig
(1985) and Townsend (1979). In particular, I consider an economy with two types
of agents, entrepreneurs and investors. Entrepreneurs have the opportunity to un-
dertake an investment project which generates a risky return of y per unit of funds
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invested but do not have funds at all. Thus, they turn to investors for external fi-
nance. In the following I will refer to entrepreneurs as borrowers as well. Borrowers
are assumed to be risk neutral.
The assumption of risk neutral borrowers, one could complain, is not very obvious
since it contradicts the arguments of Froot et al. (1993) which were presented in
section 1. However, there are certain arguments why these arguments do not hold
for the case of borrowers. Note, the setting stated above refers to the standard
situation of limited liability of borrowers.1 Limited liability, in any case, can be
considered as a kind of insurance to the borrowers since in the state of bankruptcy
the borrowers’ loss is limited to the pre-specified amount. The reason is as follows:
without limited liability the borrowers could be forced to use a part of their personal
wealth for repayment obligation in case of bankruptcy. In this case there appears,
thus, a kind of shock to the borrowers which makes the financing opportunities
of the borrowers state-dependent since they need further external finance (out of
personal wealth) in addition to the lenders’ funds. With limited liability, however,
their personal wealth is not affected (cf. Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 331). Hence
limited liability can be considered as a put option on the borrowers’ financing risk
in the state of bankruptcy. Moreover it can be shown that put options reduce –
or even eliminate – risk aversion of firms when there are state-dependent financing
opportunities (cf. Froot et al., 1993, p. 1645 ff., for a formal proof).
In contrast to Gale and Hellwig (1985) investors may be considered as private
households as well as financial institutions. In either case they wish to invest the
funds they hold into one of the following investment opportunities. First, there is a
security which generates a risk free repayment R per unit of funds at the end of the
period. Second, investors can lend out funds to an entrepreneur. Therefore, in the
following I will refer to investors as lenders as well. In this latter case lenders and
borrowers have to negotiate a contract which specifies the amount to be repayed to
lenders at the end of the period. Because of the reasons explained in the introduc-
tion, lenders are assumed to be risk averse with an increasing and strictly concave
utility function U .
The difficulty with writing a contract arises because the lenders are not able
to observe the return of the project to the borrowers without cost at the end of
the period while the borrowers can do. Hence, the borrowers have an incentive to
misreport the outcome of the investment project in order to reduce the repayment
to the lenders. The lenders, in turn, have the opportunity to incur a fixed cost of c
to buy a technology for verifying the project’s outcome. When they buy verification
they learn the outcome of the project without error. However, the information with
respect to the outcome of the project remains private information of the lender who
demands verification. As a result, the contract between a particular pairing of lender
1Instead of assuming that the borrower does not have any own funds, one could suppose the
borrower to posses of any given level of equity.
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and borrower must also specify when there is to be verification. This problem is
well known in the literature as the costly state verification problem first analyzed
by Townsend (1979). Furthermore, before writing the contract borrowers as well as
lenders do not know the ex post realized outcome from the investment project. Ex
ante both agents just know the range of possible outcomes y ∈ [y, y] with y ≥ 0
and the corresponding probability distribution function F (y) with F (y) = 0 and
F (y) = 1. Further, let f(y) = F ′(y) the corresponding probability density function
which is strictly positive as long as y ∈ [y, y] and zero else.
For keeping things tractable I need some further assumptions. First, I assume
that a lender’s riskless return from securities is larger than the minimal project
outcome (R > y). Furthermore, I assume that the borrowers have all the bargaining
power. To give a reason for this assumption one could argue as follows: When there
is a large number of lenders in the market, the borrowers will be able to acquire all
the gains form trade. This is true since in this case a single borrower can negotiate
with several lenders and enter into a contract with the one offering best terms for
the borrower. But this, in fact, is equivalent to a situation where a borrower offers
a debt contract which maximizes his payoff from trade (cf. Gale and Hellwig, 1985,
p. 650 f.).2 Further, I normalize the funds the entrepreneur needs to one. As a
consequence the borrower demands just one unit of funds from an investor. Thus, it
is sufficient for the analysis to consider only a single representative pair of borrower
and lender.
With the above assumptions, the game to be solved can be described as follows:
in the first stage the borrower ex ante offers a contract which specifies the repayment
(depending on the outcome of the project) to the lender t(y) and a set S ⊂ [y, y]
which defines when verification occurs. I will refer to this contract as debt contract
(DC). Let S ′ be the complement of S defining the states when there is no verification.
Thereafter, the lender decides on accepting the contract or not. Afterwards, the
borrower observes the outcome of the project and makes repayment to the lender,
and the lender decides wether to carry out verification or not.
To find a solution of the game stated above I begin with the analysis of the last
stage. This, in fact, is the most crucial one in the game since the problem of costly
state verification affects the behavior of both agents in this stage. Remember that as
long as the lender does not verify the outcome of the investment project the borrower
has an incentive to report a bad outcome and make only a minimum repayment.
But when the lender verifies he observes the realization of y and has to pay the fixed
cost c. In the case of verification the investment project is liquidated and the lender
gets a repayment which covers his opportunity costs. All other costs are borne by
2One could argue that in the case when lenders are financial institutions this is not a plausible
assumption. However, the qualitative results do not change when lenders are assumed to have all
the bargaining power since providing incentives to borrowers requires the same structure of the
contract.
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the borrower. Therefore, for a DC to work it has to be incentive compatible. That
is, the contract has to meet the following conditions: (i) the ex post realized set
when there is to be verification has to be the same as the ex ante specified one and
(ii) the ex post realized repayment must be the same as the ex ante specified one
(cf. Townsend, 1979, p. 270). In other words, neither contracting party may have
an incentive to deviate from the terms of contract.
As is well known from the revelation principle, any allocation of wealth among
borrowers and lenders which is contractually feasible is also feasible with direct
and incentive compatible contracts (cf. Salanie`, 1997, p. 17). That means, one can
confine attention to debt contracts in which the borrower truthfully reports outcome
and which determine the lender’s decision on verification and the repayment based
on the outcome reported by the borrower. Thus, applying the revelation principle,
one can state
Proposition 1 With risk averse lenders, a debt contract is incentive compatible if
and only if
t(y) =

t0 ; y ≥ t0
t(y) + c < t0 ; y < t0
i.e. the risk neutral borrower has to pay a fixed repayment t0 as long as there is
no verification (y ≥ t0) and an outcome dependent repayment t(y) which is smaller
than t0 else.
Proof: For the proof of proposition 1 I adapt the one of Townsend (1979, p.
287). For any debt contract (t(y), S), if the borrower reports y /∈ S the lender
will not ask for verification. In this case the repayment of the borrower is t(y) =
miny/∈S t(y) where t(y) is the ex ante specified repayment function for any outcome.
Alternatively, if the borrower reports y ∈ S the lender will ask for verification and
the repayment will be t(y) = t(y). Furthermore, the borrower must bear the cost of
verification c.
For proving that proposition 1 is necessary and sufficient for incentive compat-
ibility of the DC define t0 = miny/∈S t(y) which is constant for any y /∈ S. On the
one hand, suppose for some y′ /∈ S, t(y′) > t0. If this y′ were realized, the borrower
had an incentive to report any y /∈ S other than y′ since in this case there occurs no
verification and the repayment is lower. Thus, for the DC to be incentive compatible
t(y) = t0 ⇔ y /∈ S. On the other hand, when y ∈ S the repayment of the borrower
must be t(y) + c < t0 ∀ y ∈ S in order to be incentive compatible. Suppose there
is some y′′ ∈ S which violates this condition. Then the borrower had an incentive
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to report any y /∈ S since there occurs no verification and the repayment is lower.
Thus t(y) = t0 ⇔ y /∈ S and t(y) = t(y) + c < t0 ⇔ y ∈ S is necessary for
incentive compatibility of the DC.
It is easy to see that both conditions are also sufficient since with y /∈ S there is no
verification and t0 is repayed and with y ∈ S verification occurs and the repayment
is t(y). Furthermore, since the borrower does not have any funds he can at most pay
the realization of the outcome of the project, y, to the lender. As a result, for a DC
to be incentive compatible the set when there is no verification is S ′ = {y : y ≥ t0}
and the set where there is verification is S = {y : y < t0}.
Note that Proposition 1 is exactly the same as Proposition 1 in Gale and Hellwig
(1985, p. 653) which defines the structure of the incentive compatible debt contract
for risk neutral borrowers and lenders. Thus, the risk aversion of the lenders does
not influence the structure of the incentive compatible DC. In fact, this result is
not surprising since incentive compatible DCs make borrowers residual claimants of
the investment project and therefore create strong incentives for the borrowers to
truthfully report the outcome of the investment project to lenders. In doing so, risk
neutrality of borrowers ensures that it is not necessary to offer them a compensation
for bearing all the risk of the investment project. As a result the incentive mechanism
of DCs is not altered by risk aversion of lenders.
Now, with the result of stage 3 of the contracting game at hand the remaining
stages can be analyzed: On stage two the lender decides whether to accept the
contract offered from the borrower or not. The lender will accept the offer if and
only if the levels of expected utilities from the DC and from buying securities are
at least the same. Thus, with considering the structure of the incentive compatible
DC, one can write the lender’s participation constraint as follows:3∫ t0
y
U
(
t(y)
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
U (t0) dF (y) ≥ U (R) . (1)
With this information one can determine the optimal incentive compatible DC at the
first stage of the game. Since the borrower ,by assumption, has all the bargaining
power she can maximize her expected profit from the DC considering incentive
compatibility, the lender’s participation constraint, and the fact that her repayment
when there is verification can be at most y − c. Thus, one can state the borrower’s
optimization problem as
max
t(y),t0
∫ t0
y
(
y − t(y)− c
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
(y − t0) dF (y)
3Note, by incentive compatibility (Proposition 1) the borrower has to pay t(y)+ c to the lender
in case of verification. Thus, since in this case the lender has to pay verification cost c his payoff
is t(y) + c− c = t(y). In other words, verification cost are shifted to the borrower.
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s.t.
∫ t0
y
U
(
t(y)
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
U (t0) dF (y) ≥ U (R)
t(y) + c ≤ y ∀ y < t0
t(y), t0 > 0. (2)
In the maximization problem (2) the incentive compatibility constraint (proposition
1) has already been incorporated. From the maximization problem (2) one can
derive the following
Proposition 2 The optimal incentive compatible debt contract with risk neutral
borrowers and risk averse lenders is a standard debt contract.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Thus, the optimal repayment of the borrower when there occurs verification is
t(y) = y − c. As a result, the optimal incentive compatible DC is a contract with
the following repayment function
t(y) =
 t0 ; y ≥ t0y − c ; y < t0 (3)
which is exactly a standard debt contract (SDC) as defined by Gale and Hellwig
(1985, p. 654) where t0 can be determined by equation (19). Since t0 can be
considered as the normal case of repayment I will refer to t0 as the payment obligation
of the SDC in the following.
So far, the results do not depart from the standard case of Gale and Hellwig
(1985) with risk neutral borrowers and lenders. Therefore, one can go on comparing
the SDC with risk neutral lenders with the one when lenders are risk averse.4
For this purpose consider the lender’s participation constraint (1). The interpre-
tation of this constraint was that the lender’s expected utility from the repayment
must cover at least the utility of the riskless investment opportunity. Furthermore,
in the proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix it was shown that the participation
constraint is binding in the optimum. Thus, one can rewrite the participation con-
straint (1) as follows:
E (U (t(y))) = U (R) . (4)
Note that (4) is a very general representation of the participation constraint since
depending on the specification of the utility function it holds for risk aversion as
well as risk neutrality.
4In the following the indices ”RN” and ”RA” refer to the cases of risk neutral and risks averse
lenders, respectively.
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From the interpretation of (4) it is immediately clear that R is the so called
certainty equivalent of the risky repayment t(y).5 Now, following e.g. Kimball
(1990, p. 56) let pi be the equivalent risk premium which is implicitly defined by
EU (t(y)) = U (E(t(y))− pi(t(y))) , (5)
where E(t(y)) is the lender’s expected repayment from the borrower. Thus, the
equivalent risk premium is the certain reduction in from the expected repayment
which constitutes the same level of utility as the risky DC. Combining (4) and (5)
and using monotonicity of the utility function yields
R = E(t(y))− pi(t(y)). (6)
With (6) one can now compare the SDC with risk neutral (SDCRN) and the SDC
with risk averse lenders (SDCRA). Since the return R from the riskless investment
opportunity is the same for both situations the following condition must hold:
ERN(t(y))− piRN(t(y)) = ERA(t(y))− piRA(t(y)),
where risk neutrality implies a zero risk premium, i.e. piRN(t(y)) = 0, and for the case
of risk aversion there must be a strictly positive risk premium (piRA(t(y)) > 0). Thus
the expected repayment must be larger with risk averse lenders, i.e. ERA(t(y)) >
ERN(t(y)). Thereby, the expected repayment of any standard debt contract can be
computed as
E(t(y)) =
∫ t0
y
(y − c) dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
t0dF (y). (7)
From (7) it is immediately clear that differences in expected repayments of SDCs
can only appear due to differences in the corresponding payment obligation of the
SDCs t0.
Now, since with risk averse lenders there must be a higher expected repayment
compared to the case of risk neutral lenders I compute the change in expected
repayment when the payment obligation is altered. In doing so I can state and
prove
Proposition 3 Risk aversion of lenders leads to a higher payment obligation of the
optimal standard debt contract compared to a situation with risk neutral lenders. As
a result the expected profit of the borrower decreases.
Proof: See the appendix.
The interpretation of Proposition 3 is straightforward. Since the borrower is not
able to insure the risk averse lender against the risk of the investment project she
5For a detailed definition of the certainty equivalent see Kreps (1990), p. 84.
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has to pay a risk premium to the lender. As a result, the expected profit of the
borrower decreases. Furthermore, the rise of the payment obligation of the SDC
causes that verification takes place more often compared to a situation with risk
neutral lenders. This, in turn, increases the expected cost of verification borne by
the borrower which further decreases her expected profit.
Moreover, proposition 3 states a result in a setting of asymmetric information
which is analogous to the conclusion of the industrial organization approach of bank-
ing. E.g. Wong (1997) finds that the optimal loan rate of a risk averse bank increases
compared to the risk-neutral case.6 In fact, this result is confirmed by proposition 3
since a higher payment obligation of the optimal SDC due to risk aversion of lenders
can be interpreted as a higher loan rate paid by the borrower. However, proposition
3 is more general than the results from the industrial organization approach since
it also includes the case of direct lending, i.e. the case of borrowers issuing bonds
in financial markets. Therefore proposition 3 can be considered as generalization
of the seminal result of Jensen and Meckling (1976), who prove that for firms ex-
ternal finance is more expensive than internal finance due to agency costs. With
proposition 3 it is easy to see that because of risk aversion of external financiers –
i.e. lenders – agency costs increase and thus the reasoning of Jensen and Meckling
(1976) is strengthened.
These results are very important for analyzing the interaction of SDC’s to the
other contractual arrangements of the lender in the next section.
3 Optimal Debt Contracts with Multiple Sources
of Risk
The previous section analyzed optimal incentive compatible debt contracts with risk
averse lenders. In this regard the debt contract has been the sole source of risk the
lenders are exposed to. However, in the introduction I explained that risk aversion of
the lenders can cause interdependencies between different contractual arrangements
of a lender. That is, when there are multiple sources of risk the lenders are exposed
to, one can expect interaction among them. Since the previous section ignored this
problem, the present section will analyze the issue in more detail.
Therefore, the model presented in section 2 has to be modified. Again, consider
one representative pairing of entrepreneur and investor. The borrower can still
undertake the investment project known from the previous section. But in addition
suppose there exists a further random variable z ∈ [z, z] with z ≥ 0. Let G(z) and
6Similar results are derived in Wahl and Broll (2000), Freixas and Rochet (1997), and Broll and
Welzel (2002).
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g(z) be the corresponding cumulative distribution and probability density functions,
respectively. Further, suppose the random variables y and z to be statistically
independent, i.e. the joint probability density function h(y, z) can be written as
h(y, z) = f(y) · g(z). Without loss of generality, one can rewrite z as z = E(z) + z˜
where E(z) is the mean of z and z˜ ∈ [z˜, z˜] is a zero-mean random variable (see
Moschini and Lapan, 1995, p. 1029, for a similar argument). Let G˜(z˜) and g˜(z˜) be
the cumulative distribution and the probability density function of z˜, respectively.
With standard calculations one can easily see that given the assumptions above
G(z) = G˜(z˜) and g(z) = g˜(z˜) must hold (see Larsen and Marx, 1986, p. 133ff.).
Thus, the joint distribution of y and z˜ can be written as h˜(y, z˜) = f(y) · g˜(z˜).
The additional assumptions stated above can be interpreted as follows: z can be
considered as aggregate (random) repayment from all other contracts of the lender.
Hence, E(z) > 0 is the expected aggregate repayment from all other contracts.
Furthermore, the zero-mean random variable z˜ adds noise to the expected repayment
and, thus, exposes lenders to a further source of risk. Therefore, in the following I
will analyze in which way the additional source of risk affects the optimal incentive
compatible debt contract.
To answer the questions stated above, note first that the contracting game to
be solved is basically the same as the one in section 2. That is, the contract to
be negotiated between lender and borrower must maximize the borrower’s expected
profit considering the lender’s participation constraint and incentive compatibility.
However, due to the assumptions above, there appear changes with respect to the
lender’s participation constraint. Because of the introduction of an additional source
of risk, it is now necessary to compute the lender’s expected utility with respect to
the joint distribution of both risky prospects. Thus the participation constraint can
be rewritten as∫ y
y
∫ z˜
z˜
U (t(y) + E(z) + z˜) dG(z˜)dF (y) ≥
∫ z˜
z˜
U (R + E(z) + z˜) dG(z˜). (8)
Now, following Kihlstrom et al. (1981) and Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1991) one
can transform the participation constraint. Therefore define a utility function
V (X + E(z)) by integrating out the background risk (cf. Kihlstrom et al., 1981,
p. 914, and Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1991, p. 244), i.e.
V (X + E(z)) =
∫ z˜
z˜
U (X + E(z) + z˜) dG(z˜). (9)
The intuition of this technique is to determine the lender’s expected utility with
respect to the risky prospect z˜. Thus, the effect of the additional source of risk is
already contained in the utility function V (·).
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Thus, with this definition at hand equation (8) can be written as∫ y
y
V (t(y) + E(z)) dF (y) ≥ V (R + E(z)) . (10)
With this modifications, one can state the borrower’s maximization problem as
follows:
max
t(y),t0
∫ t0
y
(
y − t(y)− c
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
(y − t0) dF (y)
s.t.
∫ t0
y
V
(
t(y) + E(z)
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
V (t0 + E(z)) dF (y) ≥ V (R + E(z))
t(y) + c ≤ y ∀ y < t0
t(y), t0 > 0. (11)
A comparison of maximization problems (2) and (11) shows that they are formally
equivalent. The only difference is in replacing U(·) in (2) by V (·) in (11). Further,
the term E(z) is a constant not influencing the qualitative results. In particular,
the arguments regarding incentive compatibility of the contract are not affected.
As a result, one can apply the approach of section 2 to derive the structure of the
optimal incentive compatible contract which is, again, a SDC. Therefore, even when
the lender bears further background risk, the optimal incentive compatible debt
contract can be characterized by the repayment function displayed in equation (3).
As before, to compare two SDCs it is sufficient to compare the corresponding
payment obligations of both contracts. For this, one can, in principle, proceed as in
section 2: applying the definition of Kimball (1990) of an equivalent risk premium
with utility function V (·) yields
EV (t(y) + E(z)) = V (EV (t(y)) + E(z)− piV (t(y),E(z))) (12)
where piV (t(y),E(z)) is the equivalent risk premium with respect to utility function
V (·) for any given E(z) and EV (t(y)) denotes the expected repayment when the
lender’s utility function is V (·).
Combining equations (10) and (12) one derives
EV (t(y))− piV (t(y),E(z)) = R. (13)
A similar relation can be deduced for a given level of E(z) when there is no back-
ground risk z˜:
EU (t(y))− piU (t(y),E(z)) = R (14)
where EU (t(y)) and piU (t(y),E(z)) are the expected repayment and the equivalent
risk premium given E(z) with respect to the utility function U(·), respectively.7
7Note, when there is no background risk it is not necessary to calculate a derived utility function
by integrating out the influence of the additional risk. Therefore, in this situation U(·) is the
adequate utility function.
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Since I aim at a comparison of EV (t(y)) and EU (t(y)) and since the right hand
side of (13) equals the right hand side of (14) it is necessary to compare the risk
premia in both cases. As shown in the appendix, under certain conditions the
following relation holds:
piV (t(y),E(z)) ≥ piU (t(y),E(z)) . (15)
The arguments for (15) to hold can be summarized as follows: As Kimball (1993)
points out ”[. . . ] bearing one risk should make an agent less willing to bear another
risk, even when the two risks are independent” (p. 598). That is, adding a further
risk should increase an individual’s risk aversion, even when the risks the individual
is exposed to are independent. Kimball (1993) introduces the term standard risk
aversion to name this fact. It is easy to see that standard risk aversion represents
a quite natural assumption. Kimball (1993) further shows that two conditions are
necessary and sufficient for standard risk aversion. These are decreasing absolute
risk aversion in the sense of Arrow and Pratt and decreasing absolute prudence
where prudence ”[. . . ] is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare and forearm
oneself in the face of uncertainty [. . . ]”(Kimball, 1990, p. 54). Now, ensuring that
the utility function U(·) meets these requirements, one can show V (·) to exhibit a
higher degree of absolute risk aversion in the Arrow – Pratt sense than U(·) for any
given E(z). As a result the risk premium with respect to V (·) must be larger than
the one with respect to U(·) for any E(z) (cf. Kihlstrom et al., 1981, p. 911f).
Therefore, combining (13) and (14) and applying (15) yields
EV (t(y)) ≥ EU (t(y)) (16)
for any given value of E(z). Now, applying the arguments of section 2, for com-
paring the SDCs with and without background risk it is sufficient to compare the
corresponding payment obligations. Therefore, the reasoning presented in the proof
of proposition 3 still holds in an analogue way. Thus, I can state
Proposition 4 If the risk averse lender faces a further independent risk in addition
to the one of the standard debt contract with the borrower, the payment obligation
of the SDC has to increase for any given level of E(z). The expected profit of the
borrower decreases in this situation.
The interpretation of proposition 4 is simple. When there are further contractual
arrangements of the lender except the SDC with the borrower which expose the
lender to risk, then the lender is less willing to bear an additional risk. Since –
by assumption – the borrower does not have any own funds he is not able to fully
insure the lender against the risk of the investment project. Thus, the SDC further
exposes the lender to risk causing her risk aversion to increase. As a result the
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borrower has to pay a higher risk premium which requires the payment obligation
of the SDC to increase. However, for these arguments to hold one must assume that
E(z) is given and constant in both cases. Hence E(z) represents the lender’s initial
wealth generated from the other contractual arrangements. Comparing situations
where there are different levels of E(z) is difficult. When this is the case a tradeoff
appears: On the one hand, increasing the initial wealth decreases the lender’s risk
aversion due to the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion. On the other
hand, exposing the lender to an additional independent risk makes her risk aversion
to rise. Thus, the net effect is ambiguous.
Again, one can find analogous results from the industrial organization approach
of banking. E.g. Wong (1997, p. 257f.) shows that the optimal loan rate of a bank
increases as the bank becomes more risk averse. The result of increasing payment
obligation of the SDC of the present analysis can be interpreted in this way. How-
ever, Wong (1997) applies the notion of strongly more risk aversion in the sense of
Ross (1981) to derive this result which is a stronger concept than the one of a higher
degree risk aversion in the Arrow–Pratt sense. Note, for proposition 4 to hold the
stronger concept of higher risk aversion of Ross (1981) is not necessary. Therefore,
the result of the present paper holds for a wider range of utility functions. Fur-
thermore, the above analysis shows that the higher level of absolute risk aversion
is generated endogenously by the lender’s additional source of risk. Thus, the re-
sults presented above are more general the the ones of the industrial organization
approach. Moreover, since the results of the present section also hold for the case of
direct lending, it further generalizes the findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976). It
is easy to see that when outside financiers are exposed to further risks in addition
to those of the debt contract their level of absolute risk aversion increases and, thus,
make external finance even more expensive for borrowers. Therefore, agency costs
can be expected to rise due to risk averse lenders with multiple sources of risk.
4 Conclusion
In their seminal work Gale and Hellwig (1985) pointed out that in a situation of
costly state verification for risk neutral borrowers and lenders the optimal incentive
compatible debt contract is a standard debt contract. I extended the analysis of Gale
and Hellwig (1985) by assuming risk aversion with lenders. As a result, the structure
of the optimal incentive compatible debt contract does not change. However, lender’s
risk aversion causes the payment obligation of the optimal incentive compatible SDC
to rise. Hence the expected repayment of the borrower increases since with risk
aversion of the lender the borrower has to pay a risk premium which, in turn, lowers
the expected profit.
Furthermore, with the assumption of risk averse lenders the contracting situation
The Lender - Borrower Relationship 15
gets more complicated. Gale and Hellwig (1985) argue that with the assumption
of risk aversion one has to consider all the other contractual arrangements of the
lenders. Therefore, this paper provides a formal analysis of this subject. The result
can be summarized as follows: as long as there exists any further contract except
the SDC which exposes the lender to risk there appears an interaction with both
contracts even when their risks are independent. As a result, risk aversion of lenders
increases the payment obligation of the optimal incentive compatible debt contract
when the lenders are exposed to further sources of risk. That is, a further risk
increases the lender’s degree of absolute risk aversion in the Arrow–Pratt sense and
therefore forces the borrower to pay an even higher risk premium when offering the
SDC.
These results are in line with those of the industrial organization approach of
banking. Moreover, the present paper derives results in a setting of asymmetric
information which are analogous to those of the industrial organization approach.
In particular, the increase in payment obligation of the optimal SDC due to risk
aversion of lenders and adding a further source of risk can be interpreted as raising
the loan rate in these situations. But this, in fact, is the result of the industrial
organization approach of banking. However, the analysis of the present paper was
shown to be more general. That is, on the one hand the above results hold for
a wider range of utility functions. On the other hand since the results hold for
financial institutions as well as for direct external finance one gains further insights
with respect to the formation of agency costs in the sense of Jensen and Meckling
(1976).
However, there is a number of remaining questions. In particular, the assump-
tion of risk neutrality of borrowers appears questionable in some cases. It would,
therefore, be important to know whether the results of the present paper are still
valid with risk averse borrowers. The answer is by no means obvious since on the
one hand the literature on costly state verification suggests that this is the case (cf.
Townsend, 1979, p. 268ff). On the other hand the work of Hellwig (2000b) and
Hellwig (2001) as well as the literature on incentive contracts (cf. Salanie`, 1997, ch.
5) points out that with risk aversion of borrowers and lenders there appears a trade-
off between finance and insurance leading to contracts other than SDCs. Another
question regards situations when risks are not statistically independent. Note, from
the literature on choice under uncertainty it is known that, e.g., there exist circum-
stances when adding a further source of risk could be desirable from the lenders’
point of view (cf. Kihlstrom et al., 1981, p. 913). Thus, it is not immediately clear
whether the results of the analysis of this paper still hold in these cases. Therefore,
more research is needed in these fields.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the Lagrangean of maximization problem (2)
L =
∫ t0
y
(
y − c− t(y)
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
(y − t0) dF (y) +
+λ
(∫ t0
y
U
(
t(y)
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
U (t0) dF (y)− U (R)
)
+
+µ
(
y − c− t(y)
)
. (17)
The corresponding first order necessary conditions with respect to t(y), t0, λ, and
µ applying the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem are:
∂L
∂t(y)
= −f(y) + λU ′
(
t(y)
)
f(y)− µ = 0 ∀ y < t0 (18)
∂L
∂t0
=
(
t0 − c− t(t0)
)
f(t0)− (1− F (t0)) +
+λ
(
U ′ (t0) (1− F (t0))− f(t0)
(
U (t0)− U
(
t(t0)
)))
= 0 (19)
∂L
∂λ
=
∫ t0
y
U
(
t(y)
)
dF (y) +
∫ y
t0
U (t0) dF (y)− U (R) ≥ 0 ; λ ≥ 0
∂L
∂λ
λ = 0 (20)
∂L
∂µ
= y − c− t(y) ≥ 0 ; µ ≥ 0 ; ∂L
∂µ
µ = 0 ∀ y < t0 (21)
Now, equations (18) and (19) can be transformed into
λ =
f(y) + µ
U ′
(
t(y)
)
f(y)
∀ y < t0 (22)
λ =
(1− F (t0))− f(t0)
(
t0 − c− t(t0)
)
U ′ (t0) (1− F (t0))− f(t0)
(
U (t0)− U
(
t(t0)
)) . (23)
From (22) one can observe λ > 0 due to f(y) > 0, µ ≥ 0, and U ′(t(y)) >
0 ∀ t(y). Thus, from (20) the lender’s participation constraint must be binding in the
optimum. Now, let t∗0 be the optimal value of t0 which satisfies (19) for the optimal
The Lender - Borrower Relationship 17
repayment function t(y). Therefore, one can use (23) to calculate the corresponding
value of λ which has to be constant. Given this information, one can ask what the
optimal repayment function t(y) ∀ y < t0 looks like. To answer this question I look at
equation (22). There are two possible cases: In the first case, where µ = 0 ∀ y < t0,
the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem implies that y − c > t(y) ∀ y < t0 must hold. In the
second case, where µ > 0 ∀ y < t0, it must be true that y− c = t(y) ∀ y < t0 by the
same reasoning.
Consider the first case. With µ = 0 ∀ y < t0 equation (22) can be simplified to
λ =
1
U ′
(
t(y)
) = constant ∀ y < t0.
For this equation to hold it must be true that U ′(t(y)) is also constant for all y < t0
which in turn holds if and only if t(y) = constant ∀ y < t0 due to U ′′(t(y)) < 0 ∀ t(y).
But, in fact, since the borrower does not have any own funds he can pay at most
y − c ∀ y < t0. Therefore, the repayment in the case of verification can not be
constant for all realizations of y < t0 – a contradiction.
Now, consider the second case. First, note that µ > 0 ∀ y < t0 means that for
every realization of y < t0 there has to be a constant µ > 0. But for two different
realizations y1 < t0 and y2 < t0 the parameter µ need not be constant. Thus, since
the borrower can pay at most y−c ∀ y < t0 the repayment t(y) need not be constant
if and only if µ > 0 and (22) still holds. But with µ > 0 it follows from (21) that in
optimum y − c = t(y) ∀ y < t0.
Thus the optimal repayment function when there is verification is t(y) = y − c.

Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiating (7) with respect to t0 yields
dE(t(y))
dt0
= (1− F (t0))− cf(t0). (24)
Due to the properties of the cumulative distribution function F (y) and the proba-
bility density function f(y) and because of c > 0 the sign of (24) is ambiguous.
Now, consider the first order necessary condition (23) above. With the optimal
repayment function when there is verification, (23) can be rewritten as
λ =
1− F (t0)
U ′ (t0) (1− F (t0))− f(t0) (U (t0)− U (t0 − c)) . (25)
Note, with the optimal repayment function t(y) = y − c ∀ y < t0 the repayment
converges to t0 − c as y → t0 ∀ y < t0. Further, as pointed out in the proof
of proposition 2 in optimum λ > 0. Thus, because of 1 − F (t0) > 0 due to the
properties of cumulative distribution functions the following condition must hold:
U ′ (t0) (1− F (t0))− f(t0) (U (t0)− U (t0 − c)) > 0 (26)
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Furthermore, I apply a Taylor series expansion of the utility function U(t) around
t0 up to order one to get
U(t) = U(t0) + U
′(t0) (t− t0) + 12U ′′(t∗) (t− t0)2 , (27)
where t∗ is some value between t0 and t.8 With (27) one derives for t = t0 − c:
U(t0 − c) = U(t0)− U ′(t0)c+ 12U ′′(t∗) (−c)2 . (28)
Replacing U(t0 − c) in (26) using (28) and rearranging terms yields
U ′(t0) ((1− F (t0))− cf(t0)) + 12U ′′(t∗) (−c)2 > 0. (29)
Due to U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0 equation (29) is satisfied if and only if (1− F (t0)) −
cf(t0) > 0 in optimum. But this is exactly the expression derived for dE(t(y))/dt0
above. Thus, in optimum it must be true that
E(t(y))
dt0
> 0
and therefore an increase of the expected repayment requires the payment obligation
t0 of the SDC to rise.
Furthermore, the expected profit of the borrower with SDC
E(P ) =
∫ y
t0
(y − t0) dF (y)
decreases when t0 rises since
dE(P )
dt0
= − (1− F (t0)) < 0.

Proof of equation (15): For proving equation (15) I adopt the technique of
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1991, p. 244 f.). First, consider the definition of the derived
utility function (9) which can be rewritten as
V (t(y) + E(z)) =
∫ z˜
z˜
U (t(y) + E(z) + z˜) dG(z˜)
= U (t(y) + E(z)− piU (z˜, t(y),E(z))) (30)
8Note, the Taylor series expansion is not an approximation of the utility function. This is true
since the term 12U ′′(t∗)(t− t0)2 represents the error of the linear approximation of U(t). Therefore,
t∗ is not an arbitrary value, rather it is the point where the utility function must be evaluated to
correctly calculate the error of approximation (see Chiang, 1984, p. 256ff., for more details).
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due to the definition of the equivalent risk premium of Kimball (1990, p. 56). From
(30) one derives
∂V (·)
∂t(y)
= V ′ (t(y) + E(z)) = U ′ (t(y) + E(z)− piU (z˜, t(y),E(z)))
(
1− ∂piU(·)
∂t(y)
)
= U ′ (t(y) + E(z)− ψU (z˜, t(y),E(z))) (31)
where the second line of (31) follows from Kimball (1990, p. 55). That is, ψ(·) is the
equivalent precautionary premium which is defined as the certain reduction from
t(y) + E(z) that has the same effect on the optimal value of t(y) as the addition of
the random variable z˜ (cf. Kimball, 1990, p. 55). Furthermore, from differentiating
(31) with respect to t(y) one yields
∂2V (·)
(∂t(y))2
= V ′′ (t(y) + E(z)) = U ′′ (t(y) + E(z)− ψU (z˜, t(y),E(z)))
(
1− ∂ψU(·)
∂t(y)
)
.
(32)
With (31) and (32) the Arrow – Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion of the
utility function V (·) can be calculated as
−V
′′(·)
V ′(·) = −
U ′′ (t(y) + E(z)− ψU (z˜, t(y),E(z)))
U ′ (t(y) + E(z)− ψU (z˜, t(y),E(z)))
(
1− ∂ψU(·)
∂t(y)
)
. (33)
To compare the levels of absolute risk aversion for the two utility functions V (·)
and U(·) some further assumptions are needed. These assumptions regard to the
decision maker’s behavior when there appears an additional risk. Kimball (1993, p.
589) states that an individual who is already exposed to risk should be less willing
to bear an additional one, even when both risks are independent. Kimball (1993)
refers to this behavioral rule as standard risk aversion an shows that decreasing
absolute risk aversion in the Arrow – Pratt sense and decreasing absolute prudence
are necessary and sufficient therefore. The notion of prudence means ”[. . . ] the
propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty [. . . ]” (Kimball,
1990, p. 54) for which the measure of absolute prudence is an adequate one. Kimball
(1990, p. 54ff.) defines the measure of absolute prudence as −U ′′′(·)
U ′′(·) and shows the
equivalent precautionary premium ψU(·) to be proportional to this measure. Thus,
standard risk aversion requires U ′′′(·) > 0 and therefore ψU(·) > 0 and ∂ψU (·)∂t(y) ≤ 0
(cf. Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1991, p. 240f.).
For the following arguments I suppose the utility function U(·) to exhibit standard
risk aversion. Thus, from (33) one can derive the following relations to hold:
−V
′′ (t(y) + E(z))
V ′ (t(y) + E(z))
≥ −U
′′ (t(y) + E(z)− ψU (z˜, t(y),E(z)))
U ′ (t(y) + E(z)− ψU (z˜, t(y),E(z)))
≥ −U
′′ (t(y) + E(z))
U ′ (t(y) + E(z))
. (34)
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In (34) the first inequality follows from ∂ψU (·)
∂t(y)
≤ 0 and the second one appears since
U ′′′(·) > 0 (cf. Eeckhoudt and Kimball, 1991, p. 245). Therefore, the utility function
V (·) exhibits a larger degree of absolute risk aversion in the Arrow – Pratt sense
than U(·) for any E(z). As a result it must be true that
piV (t(y),E(z)) ≥ piU (t(y),E(z))
holds for any given value of E(z). 
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